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The Politics of Transsexual Love:
Hedwig and the Angry Inch and
Plato’s Symposium

Bryan Kim-Butler,
Vassar College
At the heart of the recent film Hedwig and the Angry Inch
(2001) is the question of love. A stage play adapted and directed
by, as well as starring, John Cameron Mitchell, Hedwig has become
well-known as a queer film, exploring issues of gender, sexuality,
race, nationality and performance. The film’s story, narrated by
Hedwig herself through voiceover and song, is roughly thus:
Hedwig, born Hansel, is raised in East Berlin in the years
immediately after the Berlin Wall is erected. The young Hansel
listens to American rock music and dreams of escaping
Communist East Berlin, which he does by becoming Hedwig,
taking his mother’s name, marrying an American G.I. and moving
to the US. But the sex reassignment surgery Hansel/Hedwig must
undergo goes wrong, and she is left with “a one-inch mound of
flesh,”1 the titular Angry Inch she eventually takes as the name of
her band.
I frame love in Hedwig and the Angry Inch as a question, as it
functions in the story in often ambiguous and unexpected ways.
The prospect of love also functions as a question, or rather a
quality of life put into question by a threat, in the real life of David
Reimer, who became known in the 1970s as the “Joan/John Case,”
another instance of medical intervention gone wrong, a case I will
elaborate to reflect back on Hedwig. I am providing a reading of
trans narratives in light of and exemplified by Hedwig and Reimer.
I will suggest that love in trans narratives, far from a pure or
transcendental category, often operates as a mechanism of social
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control and domination. The prospect of love or lack thereof, holds
a threat that has been utilized to forcibly define the limits of
intelligibility, of what will count as true and what will be possible.
In this way, love operates as an instrument in what Foucault calls
the politics of truth, the power/knowledge structures that define
the possibility of what we can know to be true.
Hedwig and the Angry Inch is largely about origins. The
central song of the film, “The Origin of Love,” recounts
Aristophanes’ familiar myth from the Symposium. Hedwig begins:
When the earth was still flat, and clouds made of fire, and mountains
stretched up to the sky, sometimes higher, folks roamed the earth like
big rolling kegs, they had two sets of arms, they had two sets of legs,
they had two faces peering out of one giant head, so they could watch all
around them as they talked, while they read; and they never knew
nothing of love, it was before the origin of love.2

Aristophanes’ speech describes the original humans as being of
three kinds; male beings who were the offspring of the sun, female
beings of the earth, and “androgynous” beings of the moon. When
their ambitions became threatening to the gods, Zeus cut the
beings apart into individual bodies as we know them.
Aristophanes continues:
This, then, is the source of our desire to love each other. Love is born into
every human being; it calls back the halves of our original nature
together; it tries to make one out of two and heal the wound of human
nature.3

At the end of the song, Hedwig directs her words to a “you”: “The
last time I saw you, we’d just split in two.”4
To whom is Hedwig singing? Tommy, her future lover
who will eventually betray her? Or perhaps herself? Leo Bersani’s
reading of the Symposium, which he calls “[p]erhaps the founding
text of desire as lack in the Western tradition,”5 provides insight
into these textual ambiguities. He reads Socrates’ questioning of
Agathon as instituting the idea of desire being a state of absence:
Love cannot be beautiful if it desires beauty. But, as Bersani
argues, Socrates does not in fact have textual authority; the
Symposium is a “highly selective and approximate account”6 and
the voice that might be given authority, Diotima’s, is heard only
through a recreation from Socrates’ memory. This means
“meaning itself is reconceived as a certain kind of movement”7 in
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the text, which calls our attention to its “disseminated authority.”8
Diotima’s articulation of Love as an intermediary is a “textual echo
of our textual betweenness” – a betweenness that Hedwig also
displays. Hedwig’s intermediary qualities occur in her
relationships, including her relationship to herself, to her own
body and psyche.
Bersani continues, discussing Aristophanes’ myth, namely
the question – can one desire oneself?:
If love in Aristophanes’ fable is a desire motivated by lack or need, what
the lover lacks is identical to what he is. It is more of what he is. This is a
lack based not on difference…but rather on the extensibility of
sameness…All being moves toward, corresponds with itself outside of
itself…We love, in other words, inaccurate replications of ourselves.10

In this movement of the self toward its self outside of itself, Hansel
seeks to find his double in America, explaining to his mother that
soldier Luther Robinson is going to “get me the hell out of here.”11
When Luther leaves Hedwig in a trailer park in Kansas City in
1989, she is further distraught by news from the television that the
Berlin Wall has just been brought down. The promise of love,
based on a transnational and transgendered journey, had had
politics in its scope the entire time.
Hedwig’s next lover, a teenager named Tommy Spec, is a
born-again Christian whose father is an abusive Army general. It is
of note that all of the men in Hedwig’s formative years are
connected to the U.S. military: her father was also an American G.I.
The betrayals and lost love she experiences are played against a
backdrop of military presence. Tommy, explaining the Biblical tale
of the Fall, another origin story, says, of Jesus,
You know what He saved us from was his fucking father. I mean, what
kind of God creates Adam in his image, pulls Eve out of him to keep him
company, and then tells them not to eat from the Tree of Knowledge? …
Eve just wanted to know shit.12

The story of paradise lost introduces the question of knowledge as
well as its connection to the question of love. “She gave him the
apple because they were in love,”13 Tommy says. Just after she
sings “The Origin of Love,” in voiceover, Hedwig raises a number
of questions of what exactly she desires, making love a question of
knowledge:
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It is clear that I must find my other half. But is it a he or a she? What
does this person look like? Identical to me? Or
somehow…complementary? Does my other half have what I don’t?
Were we really separated forcibly, or did he just run off with the good
stuff?14

“[R]un[ning] off with the good stuff” likely refers to Tommy’s
betrayal of Hedwig: while they are songwriting partners and
lovers for a time, he eventually steals the songs they write, even
songs she wrote before knowing him, and becomes a famous and
successful musician. Her authorship, in a way the authorship of
her own life, is stolen by the man who may have been her gateway
to the western dream of freedom: the ostensibly All-American boy
she mentors who yet betrays her by stealing her textual authority.
The film’s present action consists of Hedwig and her band, the
Angry Inch, shadowing his tour, playing gigs at diners and
recounting the story of her life in song.
It is knowledge, or rather the lack of knowledge, that
separates Hedwig and Tommy. While kissing, Hedwig moves
Tommy’s hands to her genital region, when he stops and says,
“What is that?” Hedwig pauses and replies, “It’s what I have to
work with.”15 The unknowability of deviant anatomy creates a
wall between teacher and student, lover and loved.
In Undoing Gender, Judith Butler considers the regulatory
norms placed in the psychic life of gendered power, but
insightfully also thinks through the body, how social knowledges
about gender are present in bodies. “[I]t is not just that there are
laws that govern our intelligibility, but ways of knowing, modes of
truth, that forcibly define intelligibility,”16 she writes. Butler
continues:
Justice is not only or exclusively a matter of how persons are treated or
how societies are constituted. It also concerns consequential decisions
about what a person is, and what social norms must be honored and
expressed for “personhood” to become allocated, how we do or do not
recognize animate others as persons depending on whether or not we
recognize a certain norm manifested in and by the body of that other.17

To return to the case of David Reimer, I suggest that we may view
Hedwig and other representations of trans love as existing within a
certain disciplinary framework whose domain is knowability,
thinkability, and intelligibility. Hedwig and Reimer share strange
continuities, both being victims of medical mistakes that affect
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their very personhood as viable gendered subjects. Both are in
threat of dissolution in the face of the law due to their precarious
positions in relation to and through gender.
Reimer was born as what we understand to be a normal,
healthy boy, but at eight months, his penis was burned and
severed by a doctor performing a routine procedure with a
machine others found unnecessary, which he had excessively
increased the power to and burned away a major portion of the
penis. David’s distressed parents heard of Dr. John Money, a
popular and controversial doctor who argued that a child could be
healthfully and successfully socialized as the gender other than
what s/he was assigned at birth. Money recommended that
Reimer be raised as a girl; they gave David the name Brenda and
assumed things would proceed normally. But Brenda began to
exhibit strong stereotypically “male” desires, which caused Milton
Diamond, a gender essentialist opposed to Money’s social
constructionist thesis, to intervene. In his teenage years, David
decided he wanted to live as a male, and underwent phalloplasty,
breast removal, and hormone treatment.
Butler gestures toward a reading of Reimer’s story as an
allegory with his body as marker:
This body becomes a point of reference for a narrative that is not about
this body, but which seizes upon the body, as it were, in order to
inaugurate a narrative that interrogates the limits of the conceivably
human. What is inconceivable is conceived again and again, through
narrative means, but something remains outside the narrative, a resistant
moment that signals a persisting inconceivability.18

The framework of power within which David developed can be
found in David’s recalling his doctors’ advice and coercion:
Doctor said “it’s gonna be tough, you’re gonna be picked on, you’re
gonna be very alone, you’re not gonna find anybody (unless you have
vaginal surgery and live as a female).”19

I continue with Butler’s apt reading of David’s comments: “Here
David makes a distinction between the ‘I’ that he is, the person
that he is, and the value that is conferred upon his personhood by
virtue of what is or is not between his legs. He was wagering that
he will be loved for something other than this or, at least, that his
penis will not be the reason he is loved.”20 It is clear that the
prospect of love was cruelly wielded by David’s doctors, who
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threatened him with harassment and isolation if he did not
conform to the ideas – the grid of social intelligibility – they had
made manifest in his body. The “extensibility of sameness” and
correspondence of a self “with itself” Bersani discusses are
mediated in the terms and the name of social conformity, as well
as the very intelligibility that sociality depends upon.
However, Butler insists that David retains a critical stance
toward his circumstances and his existence within them.
“Something exceeds the norm,”21 she writes, referring to David’s
insistence that there is a difference between the value of what
genitals he has and the person he is, the value of his self that may
come to be loved. “[A]nd he recognizes its unrecognizability,”22
she continues: “It is, in a sense, his distance from the knowably
human that operates as a condition of critical speech, the source of
his worth, as the justification for his worth.”23
Butler conceptualizes the normative “restrictive discourse
on gender that insists on the binary of man and woman as the
exclusive way to understand the gender field”24 as one that
“performs a regulatory operation of power that naturalizes the
hegemonic instance and forecloses the thinkability of its
disruption.”25 The symbolic law, for her, is enforced by the
iterative utterance of “It is the law.” This “utterance…
performatively attributes the very force to the law that the law
itself is said to exercise. ‘It is the law’ is thus a sign of allegiance to
the law, a sign of the desire for the law to be the indisputable law.”
Butler’s claim rings especially true for those of us who have felt
distinctly policed by a law simply by a descriptive phrasing of
what the law “is,” for instance, “Heterosexuality is just natural.”
David’s doctors’ insistence on their correctness, as well as their
simplification of terms – “You’re gonna be picked on, you’re
gonna be very alone” – show the immensity of the “desire for the
law to be the indisputable law.”26 The stated lack of love David is
told to expect becomes a performative instance of the statement “It
is the law.”
Hansel also comes up against a law, early on when Luther,
the American soldier who wishes to marry him, informs him that
the government will be doing a full physical exam, meaning he
will have to undergo sex reassignment surgery. The bodily norms
that have impacted Hedwig’s life from the very beginning
continue through his relationship with Tommy, when Tommy’s
confusion at her anatomy sends him running.
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Yet Hedwig, like Reimer, maintains a critique of the role
love has played in the definitional norms that have shaped her life.
Perhaps echoing the interlocutors in the discourse of love of the
Symposium, Hedwig says, “I believe love is immortal.” Tommy
asks, “How is it immortal,” and she responds, “I don’t know,
perhaps because…love creates something that was not there
before.”27 In the inaugural possibility inherent in her statement is
Foucault’s conception of critique: “critique…exists in relation to
something other than itself: it is an instrument, a means for a
future or a truth that it will not know nor happen to be.”28
Hedwig’s songs and performance – not least the performance of
polymorphous gendered play – could be said to reflect what
Foucault calls an “arts of existence,” which he articulates as
“those…actions by which men not only set themselves rules of
conduct, but also seek to transform themselves, to change
themselves in their singular being, and to make their life into an
oeuvre that carries certain aesthetic values and meets certain
stylistic criteria.”29 Hedwig’s artistry, her persistent idea that love
is creative, is the critical unrecognizability of her life, a question
rather than an answer. Hedwig’s transformation of her formerly
male self, the German child who idolized American rock stars, into
“the internationally-ignored song stylist, barely standing before
you,”30 creates a continuity of love, a practice, a labor of love.
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